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I
n the United States, when a consumer presents a payment to a 
merchant, the merchant typically makes a request for authoriza-
tion before accepting the payment. Personal information, such as 
an account number, address, or telephone number, is often enough to 
initiate a payment. A serious weakness of this system is that criminals 
who obtain the correct personal information can impersonate an hon-
est consumer and commit payments fraud. 
A  key  to  improving  security—and  reducing  payments  fraud—
might be payment smart cards. Payment smart cards have an embedded 
computer chip that encrypts messages to aid authorization. If properly 
configured, payment smart cards could provide direct benefits to con-
sumers, merchants, banks, and others. These groups would be less vul-
nerable to the effects of fraud and the cost of fraud prevention would 
fall. Smart cards could also provide indirect benefits to society by allow-
ing a more efficient payments system. Smart cards have already been 
adopted in other countries, allowing a more secure payments process 
and a more efficient payments system. 
Richard J. Sullivan is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
This article is on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
35This article explores why smart cards have the potential to provide 
strong payment authorization and thus put a substantial dent into the 
problems of payments fraud and identity theft. But adopting smart 
cards in the United States faces some significant challenges. First, the 
industry must adopt payment smart cards and their new security stan-
dards. Second, card issuers and others in the payments industry must 
agree on the specific forms of security protocols used in smart cards. 
In both steps the industry must overcome market incentives that can 
impede the adoption of payment smart cards or limit the strength of 
their security. 
Section I reviews the costs of payments fraud and describes how 
payments fraud is related to identity theft. It then illustrates how card 
payments in the United States are currently authorized. Section II ex-
plains how smart cards work and how they can improve payment au-
thorization. It also describes weaknesses that can remain even with the 
use of smart cards. The next two sections discuss the economic chal-
lenges that smart cards face in the United States. Section III examines 
the incentives for adopting payment smart cards and for upgrading 
payment security standards. Section IV examines the market processes 
that determine the security standard used in payment smart cards. The 
final section offers some concluding thoughts. 
I.   PAYMENTS FRAUD, IDENTITY THEFT, AND  
PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION
Payment fraud is costly to all payment participants and has indi-
rect costs that affect all members of society. Identity theft often leads 
to payment fraud, which is made possible because the authorization 
process fails to identify a fraudulent transaction. Before looking closely 
at how payment smart cards can improve the security of payment au-
thorization, it is useful to consider several basic questions. What are the 
costs of payments fraud and how are they distributed? How is payments 
fraud related to identity theft? And, what is the purpose of payment 
authorization and how does it work? 
The costs of payments fraud
The exact costs of payments fraud are difficult to pin down because 
the data on costs are not consistently reliable. Still, a review of selected 
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data helps show the magnitude of the problem and who pays the costs. 
Clearly, the costs are spread across many members of society. 
Losses from payments fraud are shouldered by banks, merchants, 
and consumers. Bank losses total about $2.89 billion per year (Table 1, 
panel A).1 The largest share of bank losses are on credit cards, followed 
by losses on checks, debit cards, and ACH payments. Fraud losses for 
retail merchants total about $15.6 billion per year, with most losses due 
to bad checks.2 Reflecting the growing importance of Internet retailing, 
merchant losses from credit card fraud at websites are now larger than 
those at brick-and-mortar locations.3 Finally, in 2007 out-of-pocket 
losses to consumers from identity theft are estimated at $5.6 billion.4 
The high costs of preventing payments fraud and of complying 
with regulatory and network security standards are similar to the es-
timates of the actual losses due to fraud (Table 1, panel B). In 2006, 
banks spent an estimated $3.1 billion to prevent payments fraud, while 
merchant spending may have reached $5.0 billion. Recently, several 
card networks (Visa, MasterCard, Discover, American Express, and 
JCB) have harmonized and updated their security standards for mer-
chants and service providers who accept or process transactions made 
with their payment cards. These standards, known as the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS), began a phased imple-
mentation process in 2005. The costs for merchants to comply with 
PCI DSS standards have been significant, with estimates ranging from 
$2.6 billion to $5.5 billion in 2006.5 
The indirect costs of payments fraud include the costs of local and 
national law enforcement, barriers to online commerce and its benefits, 
barriers to adoption of electronic payments and its efficiencies, and po-
tential loss of confidence in payments. For example, many consumers 
are wary of revealing personal information and so avoid Internet shop-
ping. One estimate suggests that the share of consumers who shop on 
the Internet, currently estimated at 66 percent, would rise to 73 percent 
if consumers did not fear disclosing personal or credit card information 
(Horrigan). Similarly, many consumers avoid electronic payments out 
of concerns for privacy and security (Benton and others). The current 
transition away from less efficient check payments would be quicker if 
consumers had less concern over the electronic payment security. 38  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Table 1
SELECTED MEASURES OF THE AnnUAL COSTS OF  
PAyMEnTS FRAUD In THE UnITED STATES
A. Fraud Losses
Payment type Losses 
($billions)
Period
Banks Credit cards 1.240 2006
Checks .969 2006
Debit cards .626 2005
ACH .065 2005
Subtotal 2.89
Merchants Checks at retail locations  10 2006
Credit cards at online retailers 3.6 2007
Debit and credit cards at brick-and-mortar  retailers 2 2006
Subtotal 15.6
Consumers All payment losses due to ID theft 5.6 2007
Sources: ABA; Fabian; Pulse; “Credit Card Fraud;” Bills; Mott 2007a; Meacham; Javelin 2008b. 




Banks Prevention for all types of payment 3.1 2006
Merchants Prevention for all types of payment 1.1 to 5 2006
Compliance with debit and credit card
security standards     2 to 5.5 2006
Sources: Kusovski; Mott 2007b, “What’s the Industry Cost;” “A Deeper Dive.” Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  39
Thus, the direct costs of payments fraud are spread across banks, 
merchants, consumers, and others, while the indirect costs, such as fail-
ure to obtain the complete benefits of Internet retailing and electronic 
payments, affect the entire economy. But payments fraud is not new 
and society has worked over time to limit the costs. What is new is a 
surge in identity theft as a source of payments fraud (Schreft). 
identity theft
Identity theft occurs when one individual misuses another indi-
vidual’s personal information to commit fraud (President’s Task Force 
on Identity Theft). In 2007, an estimated 8.1 million people in the 
United States were victims of identity theft, with total losses estimated 
at $41 billion (Javelin 2008b). Although both the total number of vic-
tims and the proportion of the U.S. population suffering from identity 
theft have declined in each year from 2003 to 2007, it remains a major 
public policy concern. 
The most common type of identity theft, existing account fraud, oc-
curs when a payment card or checkbook is lost or stolen and a criminal 
uses the card or forges a signature on a check. It can also occur using only 
the information on a credit card or check for Internet purchases or by 
creating counterfeit checks or payment cards. A second type of identity 
theft, called new account fraud, occurs when a criminal obtains personal 
information on an individual and impersonates the individual to create a 
new payment account, such as a checking or a credit card account.6 
Identity theft and payments fraud are not always the same. Some 
payments fraud, such as changing the dollar amount on an existing 
check, is not related to identity theft. Conversely, not all identity theft 
results in payments fraud. Medical identity theft is a significant prob-
lem (yip). And, a recent study of 517 identity theft cases investigated 
by the Secret Service revealed that substantial shares of the cases were 
related to fraudulent applications for loans or concealment of identity 
from authorities (Gordon and others). The same study, however, cal-
culated that 78 percent of the crimes used a victim’s identity to obtain 
cash or credit cards. 
Identity theft and associated payments fraud start with lost or sto-
len payment instruments or surreptitiously obtained bits of informa-
tion. Often the information is not difficult to obtain, such as by em-
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get it by picking through trash (Acohido and Swartz). Another source is 
hacking into online databases or intercepting payment messages. In the 
12-month period from April 2007 to March 2008, for example, more 
than 300 data breaches in the United States exposed at least 24 million 
records of personal information that could potentially be used to com-
mit payments fraud.7 
Payments fraud can then occur if these bits of information are used 
to obtain cash or goods. Criminals can obtain cash by making counter-
feit cards and using them at an ATM (Dove Consulting 2007). They 
can obtain goods with stolen or counterfeit payment cards at brick-
and-mortar retailers or with the few pieces of information needed for 
an Internet purchase. Success in each of these cases depends on the 
criminal’s ability to thwart payment authorization schemes that other-
wise prevent fraudulent payments.8 
Payment authorization
Payment authorization attempts to ensure that a person making 
a purchase uses a valid payment instrument that is properly attached 
to the associated payment account.9 It can make a merchant or other 
payee more comfortable accepting the payment instrument. It assures 
the payer that unauthorized individuals cannot easily use the payment 
instrument. And an effective authorization system makes a payment 
instrument more likely to be widely used. 
A transaction is authorized if three tasks are completed satisfacto-
rily (Ward). First, the payment instrument and other hardware are au-
thenticated. Second, the identity of the payer is verified. Third, details 
of the transaction must satisfy risk parameters set by the merchant and 
the card issuer. 
Specific methods of authorization depend on the payment instru-
ment. This article reviews authorization for debit and credit card pay-
ments in some detail because they are growing rapidly in the United 
States and because, as electronic forms of payment, they are an increas-
ingly important target for payments fraud.10
Card payment authorization differs depending on how the con-
sumer verifies their identity:  with a signature (as with credit cards and 
some debit cards) or with a personal identification number (or PIn, 
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or credit card may or may not be present during the transaction. The 
card is usually present for purchases in brick-and-mortar retailers but 
not present for Internet or telephone orders. 
In card-present transactions, a consumer uses the card at a point 
of sale, and the merchant can authenticate the card by inspecting for 
counterfeits. For signature cards, the merchant can verify the identity 
of the cardholder by inspecting the signature on the payment ticket 
against the signature on the back of the card. For PIn debit, the con-
sumer’s successful entry of the payment card’s PIn verifies the card-
holder’s identity. 
The transaction information is then sent over the payment net-
work.11 A processor can confirm that the card is valid and that the value 
of transaction is below a limit set by the card issuer. It can also check 
to see if there is a sufficient balance in the cardholder’s bank account 
(for debit cards) or if there is a sufficient line of credit (for credit cards) 
to cover the payment. To further guard against fraud, card issuers may 
employ supplementary analysis to identify transactions that are out of 
the ordinary for the cardholder. Risk parameters used in the analysis 
might include the location of the transaction, the number and value of 
recent transactions, the specific merchant where the transaction is tak-
ing place, and so on. 
Card-not-present transactions are most commonly conducted with 
signature payment cards. The merchant cannot inspect the card or ver-
ify a signature. It can use certain rules to limit risk, such as accepting 
an order only if the customer’s shipping address matches the address 
associated with the payment card. To confirm that the consumer actu-
ally possesses the card in card-not-present transactions, the merchant 
can ask the customer to provide security codes that are imprinted on 
the card and check to see if the card account number is consistent with 
the security code.12 Card networks have strict rules prohibiting reten-
tion and storage of the security codes to help ensure they are not easily 
accessible to unauthorized individuals. 
Some methods used to authorize a card in card-present transactions, 
such as card validity, transaction limits, and sufficient account balances, 
are also used in card-not-present transactions. Supplementary authori-
zation methods can also be used. The card can be further authenticated 
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enroll in the program. The cardholder registers his or her payment card 
with their card issuer and chooses a 3D Secure PIn. A transaction at 
an enrolled merchant has an extra step that requires entry of the PIn, 
thus providing further assurance that only the appropriate cardholder 
is using the payment card. 
With a properly authorized card-present transaction, the merchant 
bears little risk that it will not get the funds from the transaction. An 
authorized debit card transaction provides strong assurance that funds 
for payment are in the customer’s account and that they will be prop-
erly transferred to the merchant. With a credit card transaction, the 
merchant gets a payment guarantee from the card issuer and, if the 
transaction turns out to be fraudulent, the card issuer bears the cost. 
Fraud risk is higher for card-not-present transactions and, as a result, 
the merchant will pay higher transactions fees.14 In addition, the mer-
chant does not generally get a payment guarantee with a properly au-
thorized transaction.15 
Most cards payments, and many other payments, can be authorized 
in the United States based solely on information.16 At first, authoriza-
tion relied mainly on the card account number and transaction infor-
mation. To further fight against fraud, card issuers have expanded the 
information set they rely on to authorize a transaction, such as the loca-
tion of the transaction and the transaction history of the cardholder. 
In some Internet payment systems, such as online banking, customers 
must provide personal information to populate answers to challenge 
questions. This information can be extensive and diverse, such as the 
customer’s city of birth or the manufacturer of the first car he or she 
owned.17 
This information-intensive method of payment authorization has 
required a widening set of personal information and an expanding 
computing and communications system to keep up with criminal ef-
forts to commit fraud. Moreover, it provides an incentive for criminals 
to gather stores of information, either through public sources or by 
stealing information from private sources. Such information is valuable 
to criminals because payment authorization in the United States can 
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II.  SMART CARDS AND THE SECURITY OF PAYMENT 
AUTHORIZATION
Payment smart cards hold the promise to improve the security of 
payment authorization and help reduce the costs of identity theft and 
payments fraud. Smart cards allow a range of security options and some 
issuers have implemented the strongest upgrades, while others have 
not. This section first reviews the most commonly deployed payment 
smart card, which is based on the EMV standard. It then describes an 
alternative, the X9.59 standard, which offers several features that can 
help in the fight against identity theft. The section ends with a review of 
security weaknesses that can remain even with payment smart cards. 
eMv smart cards
EMV smart cards have powerful chips that allow advanced capa-
bilities, such as encryption and generation of digital signatures (box).18 
EMV smart cards are based on the EMV standard, which was initially 
developed by the Mastercard, Visa, and JCB payment networks, which 
sponsor the standard, and is currently maintained by EMVCo LLC.19 
The standard was issued in 1996 and has subsequently been revised 
and supplemented. EMV cards require use of a PIn by the cardholder 
for each transaction and thus are often called “chip and PIn” cards. 
Using advanced security features on EMV cards would be considered 
strong payment authentication, but it is not clear how extensively these 
advanced features are used. 
EMV payment cards are being adopted in a large number of coun-
tries worldwide (Finextra). The United Kingdom is notable for its com-
mitment to this payment card, with the rollout beginning in late 2003 
and all ATM and point-of-sale transactions in the UK required to use 
EMV cards in April 2006.20 The entire European Union has targeted 
the end of 2010 for conversion to EMV cards. Canada and Mexico are 
also adopting EMV cards. 
An EMV card is inserted into a merchant’s terminal or into an ATM. 
The first step in the authorization process involves authenticating the 
card (Murdoch). Two common card authentication techniques are static 
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EnCRyPTIOn AnD DIGITAL SIGnATURES 
The most advanced method of modern encryption uses a pair of matched 
keys, one to encrypt and one to decrypt (Anderson). If one key encrypts a 
message, the other must be used to decrypt, and vice versa. Because both keys 
are required for encryption and decryption, this method is called asymmetric 
encryption. The matched pair is unique so that one pair of keys will not work 
with another pair of keys. 
If one of the keys is kept secret, a digital signature can be created. The 
secret key can be securely coded on a payment card and used to create an en-
crypted message. If the card issuer successfully decrypts the message using the 
matching key, then it can be sure that the message was sent using the card. 
This particular use of encryption creates a “digital signature” because it 
is a message that is unique to a particular pair of encryption keys, similar to 
how handwritten signatures are unique to individuals. For this to work, the 
pair of keys must be assigned to particular individuals or devices, and the 
secret key must be used by only that individual or device. The assignment 
must be recorded and the information made available to users. 
There are various ways that such assignment can be organized. A pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI) can be created where one or more organizations 
called certificate authorities can create and assign pairs of keys. One of the 
keys is kept secret and the other is made public. The certificate authority 
creates a certificate that identifies the individual or device using a pair of keys 
and discloses the public key. For the certificate to be trusted, the certificate 
authority must attest to the validity of the assignment and to the identity of 
the individual or device to which the encryption keys are assigned. As such, 
certificate authorities in a PKI must be well established and trustworthy. 
An alternative method of organizing key assignments is for an organiza-
tion to serve as its own certificate authority and use digital certificates for its 
internal purposes. For example, a bank may create and assign pairs of keys 
for each payment card it issues. The private key is encoded securely on the 
card, and the public key is stored on an internal computer database. When 
the card is used at an ATM or at a cash register, the card creates a digital 
signature that can be used to ensure the card issuer the signature was created 
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Under SDA, a digital signature using encrypted static information from 
the card is decrypted at the merchant’s terminal to verify the card. Un-
der DDA, a code unique to the transaction is encrypted on the card to 
create a digital signature. The signature is then decrypted at the mer-
chant’s terminal to verify the card. 
The consumer enters a PIn to initiate the process that verifies the 
cardholder. The terminal sends the PIn to the card in clear text under 
SDA or encrypted under DDA. If the correct PIn has been entered, 
the transaction proceeds. 
The  next  step  authorizes  the  transaction.  Depending  on  limits 
set by the card issuer, such as the value of the transaction and other 
risk parameters, the transaction may be authorized offline or online. 
Transactions considered low risk may be authorized offline by letting 
the decision be made at the terminal. Higher-risk transactions require 
online authorization, whereby an encoded message using the unique 
information for the transaction is sent to the card issuer (or its proces-
sor). The issuer decrypts the message and, if acceptable, sends a message 
authorizing the transaction. 
Card issuers must decide whether to use SDA or DDA. The com-
puter chips on SDA cards are less costly because encryption is not con-
ducted on the card, but SDA is less secure than DDA. The static card 
verification under SDA is vulnerable because the authorization message 
can be copied and reused in another transaction.21 PIn numbers are 
exposed as they are transmitted from terminal to card (Drimer and 
others). The PIn, along with other card information, can be used to 
create counterfeit magnetic stripe versions of the card. Another vulner-
ability on some SDA cards allows hackers to reprogram risk parameters 
to make the card accept any form of verification, such as a false PIn (a 
so-called “yes” card), allowing a stolen card to be used for fraud. 
The UK, where a mix of SDA and DDA cards were issued, provides 
an early case study of the effect of the stronger payment authentication 
available on EMV cards. Total fraud losses in 2007 were actually 6 per-
cent higher than in 2004, but the mix of fraud from various sources as 
well as the distribution of losses in and out of the UK changed substan-
tially over this period (Table 2). 
Losses due to lost or stolen cards and card ID theft fell 50.9 per-
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Table 2








TOTAL 504.8 535.2 6.0
Subcategories: 
Card-not-present fraud via phone, Internet, and 
mail order
150.8 290.5 92.6
Counterfeit (skimmed/cloned) card fraud 129.7 144.3 11.3
Fraud on lost or stolen cards 114.4 56.2 -50.9
Card ID theft
(Account takeover and new accounts)
36.9 34.1 -7.6
Cards stolen from mail 72.9 10.2 -86.0
Contained within the total:
Card present fraud in 
face-to-face UK retail transactions
218.8 73.0 -66.6
UK cash machine fraud  74.6 35.0 -53.1
 
Domestic/International split of total figure:
UK fraud 412.3 327.6 -20.5
Fraud abroad 92.5 207.6 124.4
note: Distribution of EMV cards began in October 2003. Use of EMV cards became  
mandatory on February 14, 2006. 
Source: APACS. 
large margins at both UK retailers and ATMs. The reduction in fraud 
on lost or stolen cards was significant, proving that UK issuers achieved 
a major goal of EMV deployment. 
At the same time, fraud losses on card-not-present transactions 
increased 92.6 percent (phone, Internet, and mail order). Surprisingly, 
losses due to counterfeit cards rose 11.3 percent, despite the difficul-
ty of counterfeiting a smart card. This happened in part because in 
the UK EMV cards carry all the information necessary to make them 
backwards compatible with magnetic stripe cards. If criminals inter-
cept this information, they can create a counterfeit magnetic stripe 
card for use outside of the UK, where such cards are still accepted. In 
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The United States, where magnetic stripe cards are standard, was the 
top destination in 2007 for fraud on UK payment cards (Balaban). 
X9.59 standard
In the 1990s, a group was formed to assess payment authorization 
methods and develop a standard to secure all forms of electronic pay-
ments. The standard was approved for field testing in 2002, but so far 
has not been embraced by payment networks. The standard has poten-
tial to provide simplified, but strong, payment authorization. Equally 
important, it takes the incentive away from criminals to gather personal 
information for the purpose of committing payments fraud. 
In an X9.59 transaction, the consumer presents a payment card to 
a merchant and enters a PIn to initiate the authorization process.22 The 
consumer’s bank and the merchant’s bank verify the consumer and mer-
chant using digital signatures. Authorization requests include a unique 
identifier for each transaction. The payment message is delivered to 
consumer and merchant banks using payment routing codes (PRCs). 
Sensitive information is encrypted, but only a few message elements are 
necessary for authentication, allowing a relatively compact message. 
The X9.59 standard has a number of advantages. It does not require 
a public key infrastructure because banks act as certificate authorities 
by issuing encryption keys and assigning digital certificates to the ac-
counts of both consumers and merchants.23 Transaction-level identi-
fiers prevent improper reuse of authorization messages. PRCs are to be 
used only for transactions that deliver strong authentication messages 
over the entire payment network. This limitation prevents card coun-
terfeiting because, to be accepted, the PRC must be digitally signed, 
which requires a noncounterfeit card. PIn and possession of the card 
are strong factors of authentication that verify the cardholder, while 
the merchant’s digital signature verifies the card terminal.24 The type of 
encryption used does require a sophisticated chip on the card, and the 
standard simplifies the processing to the point that relatively modest 
processing power is needed. 
Many of the strategies inherent in the X9.59 standard are being 
used in EMV cards, such as the requirement to use a PIn to verify 
the cardholder. But the X9.59 standard offers strong end-to-end secu-
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infrastructure and with a drastically reduced need to harden the secu-
rity of every element of a payment system (Wheeler). Most important, 
the standard eliminates personal information from payment authoriza-
tion. Even if a criminal breaks into a database to obtain the PRC, the 
bank account number, name, and address of an accountholder, the in-
formation cannot be used in an X9.59 transaction because the criminal 
would not have the card. As a result, the motivation to perpetrate pay-
ments fraud from this form of identity theft is drastically reduced. 
Smart card security weaknesses 
EMV smart cards have had mixed results in the UK, due to sev-
eral remaining security weaknesses. Some of the weaknesses have been 
demonstrated by computer experts.25 In 2007, computer experts tested 
two of the most common EMV card readers in use in the UK at retail 
points-of-sale (Drimer and others). Despite satisfying EMV security 
standards, researchers found that both types of terminals had vulner-
abilities. They successfully modified the terminals with a paper clip or 
needle, attached a recording device, and found that many EMV cards 
used SDA, allowing information exchanged between the card and the 
terminal  to  be  captured  without  being  detected. The  information, 
which included a PIn code, would allow criminals to counterfeit a 
magnetic stripe version of the card or use the information in card-not-
present transactions. 
It is not known to what extent these vulnerabilities are being exploit-
ed, but they demonstrate that smart card hardware alone does not guar-
antee secure authentication. Choices, such as the use of static or dynamic 
data authentication to verify EMV cards, underscore the importance of 
security protocols. Insecure card readers illustrate how the entire line of 
communication for payment authorization must be protected. 
More broadly, current strategy for authorization methods used in 
EMV cards adds encryption and digital signatures to an existing autho-
rization model. To make this system work at the highest level of secu-
rity, the payment card, card issuer, and merchant terminal must each 
have digital certificates. These in turn must be supported by a public 
key infrastructure. The complex infrastructure and trust relationships 
required to support this infrastructure have been seriously questioned 
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volume becomes larger and more complex because messages may be 
required to verify each certificate. Message size is affected because en-
crypted messages are larger. 
These concerns are less important with the X9.59 standard. Another 
important benefit of X9.59’s reduced reliance on public information for 
authorization is that it greatly reduces the need for, and cost of, PCI DSS-
mandated upgrading of security of the entire payments infrastructure.
But the full benefits of both the X9.59 and the EMV standards will 
not be realized as long as support remains for legacy payment systems. 
In particular, magnetic stripe cards and the current methods of con-
ducting Internet transactions are vulnerable. These weaknesses attract 
even more criminal activity if security in other elements of the pay-
ments system is fortified. 
III.  ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR ADOPTING  
PAYMENT SMART CARDS 
Both the EMV and X9.59 are feasible technologies that could 
reduce payments fraud, but neither technology has been adopted for 
payments in the United States. Lack of adoption may be related to how 
the market can limit incentives to adopt payment smart cards. Market 
incentives are tied to private benefits and costs, which can hold up 
adoption of payment smart cards even if their social benefits are greater 
than adoption costs. Limited incentives for adoption are related to the 
network nature of the payments system, support for legacy payment 
systems, and disruptions to business and consumer interests. 
For issuers to adopt the payment smart cards, its private benefits must 
outweigh its costs. The cost of smart cards themselves has fallen consider-
ably because computer chips are much less costly today than in the past, 
and the cost will continue to fall. Another significant cost involves upgrad-
ing the point-of-sale payment terminals and associated software. This type 
of cost could be minimized by requiring upgrades over an extended period 
(such as five years), so that installing a smart-card enabled payment termi-
nal would be part of a normal equipment upgrade cycle. While trends in 
adoption costs are favorable, card issuers in the United States have not yet 
chosen to deploy payment smart cards. 
Limited incentives for upgrading security of U.S. card payments 
remain significant because it is difficult to coordinate security efforts 
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mainly by private costs and benefits. For example, the share of new 
account fraud resulting from identity theft has declined in recent years 
as the financial industry has more carefully verified the identity of con-
sumers who apply for an account (Javelin 2008a). Because the cost of 
new account fraud is largely borne by financial institutions, it should 
be expected that they put considerable effort toward its reduction.26 In 
general it is unlikely that the distribution of the costs of security up-
grades will match the distribution of its benefits for banks, merchants, 
consumers, and government, which limits the extent to which individ-
ual incentives can control payments fraud. Moreover, if improvements 
to security standards for one element of the payment network reduce 
fraud elsewhere, one group of payment participants may “free ride” on 
the security upgrades of others. 
Second, the spillover effects of security failures on the payment 
network can have an adverse impact on incentives to upgrade security. 
For example, the large 2006 data breach at TJX Companies, Inc., led 
to payments fraud that affected consumers and caused losses at card 
issuers. Card issuers also bore the expense of reissuing some payment 
cards. Although TJX faced considerable expense of it own, and reached 
settlements that reimbursed cardholders and card issuers (Aplin), it is 
not always clear that payment participants who are responsible for se-
curity breaches face the full cost of the consequential damage (Becket 
and Sapsford).27 Moreover, implementation of the EMV standard has 
prompted some card networks to shift liability for fraud from card is-
suers to other payment participants, which can reduce the incentive 
of card issuers to limit fraud (Anderson and others). This has broad 
consequences because card networks and issuers have a great degree of 
control over security protocols in payment authorization. 
The continued use of legacy payment instruments is a similar co-
ordination problem. There is always a transition period when a pay-
ment network upgrades its technology so that payment options with 
weaker security coexist with those that have stronger security. As the 
UK experience shows, increased security of one form of payment may 
simply shift payments fraud to other payment options with weaker 
security. Subsidies and deadlines for adoption can help to reduce the 
length of the transition period. Perhaps more difficult is a commitment 
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Another challenge is that the revenue generated from payment ser-
vices can be significant for some payment providers, and a change in 
payment security standards can affect those revenue streams. For ex-
ample, estimates show that banks make more revenue from signature 
debit compared to PIn debit.28 Because the EMV and X9.59 standards 
would essentially eliminate signature debit, bank revenue for payment 
services could be reduced. 
Use of smart cards for payments will also require some adjustment 
of consumer habits. Consumers would lose the option of using a sig-
nature for payments, and card issuers are typically reluctant to limit 
consumer choices.29 Consumer experience with Internet commerce 
would also change because payment smart cards might be required for 
Internet transactions.30 
A long-term strategy must address security weaknesses by improv-
ing authorization of all types of payments.31 Legacy payment instru-
ments may need to be phased out so that over time payments will 
migrate to forms with strong authorization security. But new authori-
zation protocols should avoid excessive disruption to business interests 
and significant customer inconvenience or they will not be adopted. 
IV.   THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY STANDARDS
Economic forces related to upgrading technical standards can also 
slow adoption of payment smart cards. The replacement of older tech-
nical standards with new ones has been studied extensively by econo-
mists. The studies relevant to payments fall into two groups. The first 
concerns the network nature of payment systems, which may produce 
a potential bias away from common security standards and a tendency 
to entrench inferior security standards. The second group considers the 
process by which security standards are developed. To be successful, the 
standard setting process in payments must enourage consensus, have 
limited scope, and be carefully designed. 
network industries and standards entrenchment
One purpose of a security standard is to ensure compatibility. For 
example, the EMV standard must be used with a compatible card reader. 
In the United States, most payment card readers are not compatible. A 
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its  payment  instrument  either  compatible  or  incompatible  with  the 
hardware and communications systems of other payment networks. 
Compatibility alone, however, may not ensure a move toward a 
stronger payment authentication standard. In markets where network 
externalities and economies of scale are strong, the industry is likely to 
emerge as an oligopoly (few firms) where there is one dominant firm. 
A dominant firm with loyal customers will likely be uninterested in 
establishing a common security standard, despite the efficiencies and 
enhanced social welfare that might accompany a common standard, 
because the firm may perceive a competitive advantage to incompat-
ibility (Wiseman). If the benefits of standardization are strong enough, 
we may observe a coalition form to establish standards, as has hap-
pened with EMV. But gaining consensus can be difficult. 
Economic analysis suggests that in the early stages of a network 
industry competing firms must quickly establish a base of customers 
in the race to become dominant. For example, below-cost pricing is a 
viable short-term strategy. But it also becomes possible that the firm 
that succeeds and becomes dominant in the industry does not have the 
best technology. 
In the case of payments, the leader that emerges may not have the 
best security features.32 Payment instruments have multiple features, 
and consumer adoption decisions will weigh all of the features. The 
network aspect of payments implies a strong benefit from widespread 
use. That is, if many others are using a particular payment option, then 
a consumer may decide to use it as well because it is more likely to 
be widely accepted.33 Consumers may understand that one payment 
option has better security features than another, but nevertheless may 
adopt the payment option with inferior security if it is widely used. 
An inferior security standard can be difficult to displace in a net-
work market once it is in place. Customers decide to adopt a new prod-
uct based on the number of others that use the product and the per-
ceived benefits of shifting to a new product (Greenstein and Stango). 
Thus, a large installed base of an existing product is a barrier to adopt-
ing a new product with a superior technology. In the payments market, 
the larger the number of consumers and merchants using a particular 
security standard, the higher the perceived security benefit must be to 
justify a switch. Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  53
Standards development
Instead of market competition, a formal development process at the 
industry level can determine security standards. There are several such 
processes for payments in the United States. One is where an organiza-
tion (or sponsor) has close control over the payments system and takes 
the lead in determining the standards for the system, such as in the 
Fedwire payments system or in credit card networks. An alternative is 
standard setting organizations (SSOs). 
In the U.S. payments system there are two types of SSOs. Industry-
based SSOs are voluntary and their memberships are drawn from a spe-
cific payment system, such as the national Automated Clearing House 
Association (nACHA), which oversees standards development and main-
tenance for the ACH system.34 The second type of SSO is independent 
of specific payment systems. In the United States, the American national 
Standards Institute (AnSI) accredited the X9 committee for financial 
standards in 1984.35 The X9 process is voluntary and depends on mem-
bers of industry contributing resources to standards development.
A number of factors determine whether standards development will 
be successful. As mentioned above, consensus can be difficult to reach 
if firms perceive incompatibility as a competitive advantage. Some pay-
ments providers may have developed security technology independently 
and in some instances may have obtained patents and trade secrets they 
seek to exploit. Thus, intellectual property is a potential barrier to devel-
oping standards in the financial industry (Hunt and others). 
The degree of control of the sponsor also plays a role in standards 
development. A sponsor with strong control over decisions can develop a 
standard more quickly than the decentralized process typical of an SSO. 
However, a closely controlled process may not succeed in generating a 
standard that gains consensus by those affected. Actual security depends 
not only on the features of the standard but also the degree to which it is 
implemented and followed. As a result, there may be a trade-off between 
speed of development and compliance with the standard. 
Because some common interests in payments security exist, an SSO 
could usefully coordinate the development of payment security standards. 
To be successful, research suggests that the scope of the standard needs to 
be carefully defined, addressing a common business need but avoiding 
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and others). The governance structure of the SSO must manage compet-
ing interests. Its success would depend on voluntary but open participa-
tion, limited costs of participation, clear rules for decision making that 
foster consensus, and a philosophy of participation that is based on self-
interest but recognizes the common interest. 
Participation in the SSO by a broad cross-section of the industry is 
valuable, but commitment of significant members of the industry is es-
sential. The process also needs to encourage adoption of the standards, 
and it helps if actual participants act as change agents within their own 
organization through communication and education. Adoption is fa-
cilitated by standards that are well-defined, complete, and flexible. Fol-
low-up may be needed for standards maintenance which may require a 
formal, ongoing organization. 
Vested interests can make the work of SSOs difficult (Greenstein 
and Stango). The costs and benefits of adopting a standard will vary 
across affected parties, and as a consequence, some participants may 
delay or impede progress. A clear policy toward applicable intellectual 
property can avoid roadblocks and misunderstanding. Options such 
as compelling licenses for intellectual property can help the SSO reach 
consensus more quickly. 
In short, both the network structure of the payments system and 
the difficulty of developing security standards can present barriers to 
improving payment authorization. The implication for payment smart 
cards is clear: Even if the societal benefits justify their cost, payment 
smart cards with strong authorization security may be adopted slowly. 
V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Today there is great public concern about identity theft both be-
cause of its direct costs to victims and its invasion of privacy. From a 
public policy perspective, identity theft is a concern because it attacks 
the payment system and could undermine confidence in it. Market 
forces have generally worked well at limiting risk in retail payments and 
may be sufficient to answer the challenge of identity theft. But market 
forces depend on adequate incentives, and these incentives are increas-
ingly unclear. Identity theft, for example, can occur because a con-
sumer lends a payment card to an irresponsible friend, a card processor 
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card issuers accept weak authorization protocols. Identity theft blurs the 
line between responsibility for, and control of, payments fraud. Conse-
quently, trends in payments fraud and identity theft need to be carefully 
monitored to ensure that it does not threaten the integrity of the pay-
ments system. 
Payment providers are finding solutions to payments fraud and 
identity theft. Many of these efforts aim to bolster security of the pay-
ments network, but the results do not significantly change the basic 
underlying model of payment authorization. As a result, a costly effort 
is under way to harden the security of payment information when it 
is in transit and where it is stored. Authorization has shifted to more 
real-time data, which requires a complex and expensive infrastructure. 
Data requirements are increasingly intensive, especially for supplemen-
tary authorization. As long as authorization is information intensive, 
criminals have incentive to gather and exploit information to commit 
payments fraud. 
The EMV standard relies on smart cards and can potentially intro-
duce significant upgrades, such as two-factor cardholder verification—a 
smart card and a PIn—to fortify authorization security. However, the 
strongest security configuration is not always used, and EMV perpetuates 
the information-intensive method of payment authorization. The X9.59 
payment security standard also uses two-factor authentication but relies 
less on personal information. Adoption of this standard would reduce the 
fear of exposing personal information on the Internet because it reduces 
the ability to use the information for payments fraud. 
The use of smart cards to improve payment authorization methods 
faces significant challenges. The distribution of costs and benefits across 
payment  participants  determines  the  private  incentives  to  improve 
methods of payment authorization, but the outcome of those efforts is 
not necessarily best from society’s point of view. The tendency for crimi-
nals to shift their efforts toward areas of weakness implies that security 
in all types of payments needs to be fortified. But the view that secu-
rity is a means to gaining competitive advantage reduces the willingness 
of payment providers to participate in developing a strong, common 
security standard. The complex network structure of payments makes 
coordination of standards development difficult. And even if there is 
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standard setting process must be well organized and pursued properly 
to avoid failure. 
Smart cards have the potential to provide strong payment autho-
rization and thus put a substantial dent into the problem of identity 
theft and payments fraud. The falling costs of infrastructure are tilting 
the cost-benefit calculation in favor of adopting payment smart cards 
in the United States. But some significant challenges must be overcome 
before smart card deployment can substantially improve the security of 
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EnDnOTES
1 The most reliable statistics in Table 1 are the fraud losses for banks, consum-
ers, and Internet merchants. Least reliable is the cost of PCI DSS compliance for 
merchants, but they are based on reports from industry experts. 
2non-retail losses to payments fraud by industrial and non-commercial firms 
are fairly minimal (AFP survey). 
3This grossly understates the burden of fraud losses borne by Internet mer-
chants. Credit card losses as a percent of sales are 1.4 percent for Internet retailers 
and under 0.05 percent for brick-and-mortar merchants. (Internet losses and rates 
of fraud are taken from CyberSource. The brick-and-mortar estimate is the $2 bil-
lion in losses shown in Table 1 divided by the $4.03 trillion estimate of total retail 
sales for 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau)). 
4This estimate is the consumer portion of the costs of identity fraud reported 
in a recent survey (Javelin 2008a). An estimate of the cost of identity fraud to 
businesses would then be $35.4 billion (the $41.0 billion minus $5.6 billion). 
This estimate of business losses is problematic because the sum of all reported 
payments fraud losses in Table 2 is only $18.5 billion. Consumers may report the 
gross value of fraud that they experience, but businesses avoid a portion of those 
costs by preventing some fraud losses or by recovering funds after the fraud is dis-
covered. The out-of-pocket losses reported by consumers is likely more credible 
because it represents their personal experience. 
5It is unclear whether this represents an initial cost of upgrading security or 
whether this will be an ongoing cost. 
6Existing account fraud represents an estimated 74 percent of all identity theft 
(Javelin 2008a). According to a 2004 survey, the median cost of existing credit 
card identity theft was $750 compared to $3,000 for new account fraud (Javelin 
2005). One reason for the difference is that it takes longer to become aware of 
new account fraud so that the criminal has more time to run up charges. 
7Data breach statistics calculated from publicly announced data breaches 
published by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse www.privacyrights.org/ar/Chron-
dataBreaches.htm. 
8A  worldwide  underground  market  for  information  useful  for  payments 
fraud has developed in the last few years (Anderson and others 2008). 
9Another important phase of payment risk management is the verification 
of new customer identity and other information before issuing a payment instru-
ment. This article focuses on transaction-level authorization. 
10Sometime between 2003 and 2006, the number of card payment transactions 
surpassed check transactions in U.S. retail payments (Federal Reserve System). 
11The example presented here uses online authorization where communica-
tion with a payment processor is used for immediate, real-time access to infor-
mation. offline authorization occurs without such communication, but as with 
online authorization the card issuer sets risk parameters that a transaction must 58  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
satisfy before it is authorized, such as inspection of the payment card and screens 
that check of consistency of information stored on the card. Offline authorization 
serves as a fall-back option when card readers malfunction, lines of communica-
tion are unavailable or if the card processor’s system is down. Offline authorization 
is also less expensive and is sometimes used for low-value, low-risk transactions. 
12Visa and MasterCard call these card verification values (CVV) and card veri-
fication codes (CVC). 
13Visa’s program is called Verified-by-Visa, MasterCard’s is SecureCode, and 
JBC International is J/Secure. 
14One analyst reports that 49 percent of transactional fraud is from card-not-
present transactions (Green). 
15If an authorized transaction turns out to be fraudulent, then the merchant’s 
bank will “chargeback” the transaction. That is, it will recover the funds for the 
payment from the merchant’s account. The merchant, rather than the card issu-
ing bank, bears the risk of payment card fraud. As a result, managing chargebacks 
is becoming routine among Internet merchants and can be a significant expense 
(CyberSource). The merchant can transfer this risk to the card issuing bank if it 
participates in a 3D Secure program. 
16Some payments, such as check and ACH, can be authorized using a bank 
routing number, a consumer account number, and other relevant information. 
17Concern for security led bank supervisors to require stronger security in In-
ternet banking and payments (Board of Governors), and as a result many financial 
institutions have used these challenge and response systems. 
18Recently, contactless payment cards have been deployed in the United States 
that communicate with readers via radio frequency signals. These cards could be 
called smart cards because they use electronic chips for radio communication. 
However, the cards are essentially the same as magnetic stripe cards in the way they 
are authenticated and the associated payment is authorized and will therefore not 
be discussed in this article. 
19EMV is named after the original sponsors of the standard, Europay, Mas-
tercard, and Visa. Europay was later absorbed by MasterCard. JCB joined the 
standard in 2004. For more information, visit www.emvco.com. 
20Visit www.chipandpin.co.uk for more information on the UK chip and PIn 
program. 
21This weakness is referred to as a “replay attack.”
22This description is based on a particular implementation of X9.59 called the 
account authority digital signatures (AADS) and used at brick-and-mortar retail-
ers. The X9.59 standard is adaptable to other implementations. See www.garlic.
com/~lynn for more information on X9.59 and AADS. 
23Certificate authorities attest that specific encryption keys are assigned to spe-
cific individuals, and a public key infrastructure supports the use and integrity of 
digital signatures. Box 1 explains these terms in more detail. Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  59
24Factors of authentication are independent means of verifying an individual 
or device. In general, more factors imply stronger security. 
25Contactless cards in the U.S. also have some security weaknesses. In 2006, 
computer scientists put together a contactless card reader and tapped it with 
unopened envelopes that contained contactless payment cards issues by U.S. 
banks (Schwartz). The investigators could read the cardholder’s name, card num-
ber, and the card’s expiration date. Tests revealed that 20 cards—each issued 
in 2006—all failed at least one method of attack. In at least one instance, the 
card information was used to conduct a transaction. Card issuers and networks 
claim implementation of contactless cards is secure, but reports of skimming 
vulnerability of U.S. bank-issued contactless cards have been published as late as 
February 2008 (Vamosi). 
26Another possible indication that card issuer anti-fraud efforts do not place 
the highest priority on protecting cardholders is that the average out-of-pocket 
cost per identity theft victim rose in 2007 to $691, up 25 percent from the $554 
average reported in 2006 (Javelin 2008b). 
27Economists refer to the disconnect between costs and responsibility as 
an externality. 
28This is true even after adjustments for higher fraud losses of signature over 
PIn debit. Revenue for signature debit is estimated to be 65 basis points higher 
than PIn debit (Pulse), while the differential for fraud losses is about 4 basis points 
(Star Systems 2005). 
29This inconvenience may be limited because surveys suggest that since 2001 
consumers have preferred PIn to signature debit (Star Systems 2006; Dove Consult-
ing 2005; Boyer). Consumer inconvenience is further limited by the trend towards 
eliminating the requirement for either a signature or a PIn in low-value payments. 
30To enable these transactions, consumer computers might need be equipped 
with smart card readers. 
31Protocols have already been designed to adapt EMV and X9.59 standards 
for Internet payments (Levi and Koç; Khu-Smith and Mitchell).
32This is not necessarily an example of market failure. If the market has in-
complete information—for example, is unable to anticipate future threats—then 
security standards may be put into place that become inadequate at some time in 
the future. 
33Economists refer to the consumer benefit from widespread use a usage externality. 
34nACHA develops both technical standards (such as ACH message formats) 
as well as standards for business practices that aim at managing risk. 
35A significant part of the committee’s work concerns security, but it also de-
termines standards for the formats of electronic payment messages, the formats for 
paper checks, payment processing, and electronic credit records. Consult the X9 
committee website (www.X9.org/home) for more information. AnSI is a subgroup 
of the International Standards Organization (ISO). 60  FedeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
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